

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 13, 2025

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Los Alamos Site Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Activity Report for the Week Ending June 13, 2025

**Plutonium Facility–Glovebox Safety:** Workers were performing waste packaging after a glass downsizing operation when one worker experienced a poking sensation consistent with a punctured glove and a small wound. Radiological control technicians (RCTs) responded, and the incident was resolved without contamination spread or uptake. The post-job review team determined the glass downsizing operation and waste removal were conducted under a general use procedure that was not intended for this type of work. Typically, a different team of workers performs glass downsizing activities, categorizing them as a high-risk due to the creation of glass shards, and develops a specific job hazards analysis and controls plan to protect the gloves. Site management then individually approves the high-risk activity plan. Facility management is looking into several solutions, including performing downsizing immediately after window removal, revising the general use procedure to better describe its intended scope, and providing additional training to staff on its proper use.

**Plutonium Facility–Configuration Management:** Construction workers who were roughening concrete to provide a bonding surface for grout removed more material in a small section of floor than was required by the approved design specifications and work plan. The floor section being modified provides support to the building confinement structure for design basis loading conditions such as a seismic event. The approved design change specifications required the concrete to be scored to a maximum depth of one quarter inch; however, between one-half and two-and-a-quarter inches were removed in three areas. Facility staff stopped work, and engineering staff conducted an immediate evaluation, determining that the confinement structure was not compromised. Facility management is conducting a root causal analysis to help develop corrective actions that will prevent this from occurring in the future. Additional engineering actions remain, including formally documenting the structural analysis and updating the facility modification and design basis to account for the excess concrete removal.

**Area G–Radiation Protection:** Last Thursday, N3B RCTs identified removable contamination during a large area swipe of a standard waste box (SWB) containing a corrugated metal pipe segment being staged in a dome for shipment. RCTs subsequently conducted more precise and targeted swipes on the SWB gasket for analysis and confirmed removable contamination at levels up to 427 dpm/100 cm<sup>2</sup> from alpha decay. Later that day, RCTs also identified minor contamination on the bottom of the same SWB. Based on the radiological controls for the dome where the SWB was housed, the limit for removable contamination is 20 dpm/100 cm<sup>2</sup> from alpha decay and 200 dpm/100cm<sup>2</sup> from beta decay. The contractor took action to restrict access to the dome; draft a survey and recovery plan; survey people and equipment for potential spread of contamination; tape over areas with contamination (e.g., the SWB gasket) to prevent any future spread; and post the location as a contamination area until the issue is resolved. The contractor is currently performing a causal analysis with an extent of condition review, given there have been similar incidents in the past, and is considering further compensatory measures.